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FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND THE MASHANTUCKET
PEQUOT: UNION ORGANIZING AT FOXWOODS CASINO
Derek Ghan*
I. Introduction
The Mashantucket Pequot’s gaming enterprise has allowed the Pequot
Reservation to reemerge with a definable cultural identity. Given how close
this once powerful presence came to extinction, the Tribe has been active
and aggressive in exercising its sovereign right to retain complete autonomy
and control over its gaming enterprises.
It should come as no surprise that in 2008, the Tribe was less than
enthusiastic to find itself in the midst of an organizing campaign at
Foxwoods Casino — one in which the National Labor Relations Board, the
federal labor relations administrative agency, declared it had the jurisdiction
to regulate the Casino’s workforce. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
established federal jurisdiction over labor relations on reservations two
years earlier in San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB;1 however, the
distinctively central role that tribal casinos play in the survival and cultural
development of most tribes calls for a specialized and coherent policy that
recognizes and addresses the idiosyncrasies of labor organizing campaigns
at tribal casinos. The United Auto Workers (“UAW”) campaign at
Foxwoods illustrates the possibilities and pitfalls of such a campaign.
During the UAW Foxwoods campaign, the Pequot perceived a threat to
the Casino as a threat to the Tribe’s very survival. The campaign at
Foxwoods revealed tension between a tribe that fought an uphill battle to
achieve economic sustainability and a workforce looking for a respectable
wage, job security, and a healthy work environment. Balance can be
achieved between these competing interests — the interest of the workforce
and that of tribal sovereignty. Federal regulators, however, missed an
opportunity to strike this balance by not crafting an explicit policy in this
emerging intersection of labor and tribal law.

* J.D. University of Connecticut School of Law 2012, B.A. Seattle Pacific University
2005. I would like to thank Professor Bethany Berger for her guidance as well as my peers at
the University Connecticut School of Law, particularly Elizabeth Kreick for her valuable
contributions and editorial eye. I would also like to thank my wife Adriana for her patience
and support. Finally, I am grateful for the editorial support from the staff of the American
Indian Law Review.
1. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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The most apparent symbol of the Tribe’s departure from its troubled
past2 is the massive gaming complex it has constructed. As you drive east
on Route Two and slowly reach the crest of a small incline, you see the
trees open up for the monument to the Tribe’s economic success. The
Foxwoods Resort Casino stands like a metropolitan oasis in the forested
area of southeastern Connecticut.3 It has been described as the largest
casino resort in the Western Hemisphere.4 The Casino is the product of an
aggressive campaign to rehabilitate the disappearing Tribe. A small cadre
of Pequots initiated that campaign in the early 1970s, led by the grandson of
one of the last remaining members on the reservation.5
Since the launch of the gaming enterprise, the Tribe’s on-reservation
population has grown exponentially. Economic success drew members back
to the reservation whose families had left in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries in search of better wages than could be offered by the Tribe.
As the Casino brought prosperity, the Tribe focused its attention on the
study of the Mashantucket Pequot’s culture and ethnohistory. This new
focus developed in tandem with the reemergence of the Tribe’s onreservation population, serving the dual purpose of educating the nonNative public as well as the newer generation of the Pequot community.
This Article will analyze how the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe (“Tribe” or
“Pequot”), the pro-union campaigners, and the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) responded to the 2008 union organizing
campaign at Foxwoods Casino in light of the Casino’s role in the Tribe’s
survival and cultural reemergence. To better understand the Tribe’s
contemporary decision making, it is necessary to first examine the historical
context in which the Tribe evolved.
Part II will survey the historic relationship of the Pequot with the State of
Connecticut as well as the federal government. Part III will address some
modern milestones in the Tribe’s development that set it apart as a unique
case study from other native nation’s rebuilding stories. Part IV will
introduce the labor organizing campaigns beginning in 2007, focusing on
the campaign conducted with the help of the UAW Union on behalf of the
Foxwoods table game dealers.

2. See infra Part II.
3. Michael Sokolove, Foxwoods Is Fighting for Its Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 14,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/magazine/mike-sokolove-foxwood-casinos.htm
l?pagewanted=all.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Finally, Part V will evaluate the tribal, union, and federal agencies’
responses to the organizing campaign in light of the inimitable cultural reemergence and economic development of the Tribe. The Tribe’s evolution
greatly influenced how the Tribe viewed the organizing campaign as well
as how it strategically responded. Additionally, this section will examine
the response of both the union and the NLRB and evaluate the two
organizations’ roles. This article argues that the NLRB missed an
opportunity to develop crucial labor regulation policy at tribal casinos;
however, by simply acknowledging the unique history and circumstances of
the Pequot, the union was better able to produce substantive results that
appeased both the organizing employees and the Tribe.
II. A Brief History of the Mashantucket Pequot: From First Contact to the
1970s
The story of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, like many other stories of
native tribes after Anglo contact, is one laden with tragedy. During precolonial and the early colonial eras, the Pequot held significant economic
influence in the region due to the Tribe’s control over the wampum trade.6
Wampum, a small tubular bead made from a specific crustacean, acted as
the preferred currency among tribes in the southern New England region.7
Indeed, European colonials, particularly the Dutch and English, quickly
recognized the importance of wampum in the fur trade.8 They created a
trade triangle, first exchanging manufactured European goods for wampum
in the coastal regions, then sailing inland to exchange the wampum for furs,
which they then sold for enormous profits in Europe.9 The Tribe was
strategically positioned between the inland fur traders and the weaker
coastal bead-makers, making the Pequot the de facto “mintmasters” of the
southern New England wampum trade.10
The spike in trade activity after the arrival of the European colonists
shoved the Pequot into the economic spotlight, making the Tribe one of the
most rich and powerful groups in the region. Noted nineteenth-century

6. See Lynn Ceci, Native Wampum as a Peripheral Resource in the SeventeenthCentury World-System, in THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND: THE FALL AND RISE OF
AN AMERICAN INDIAN NATION 48, 59 (Laurence M. Hauptman & James D. Wherry eds.,
1990) [hereinafter THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND].
7. Id. at 48-49.
8. Id. at 55-58.
9. Id. at 58-59.
10. Id. at 59-60.
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historian John De Forest11 characterized the Tribe as “the most numerous,
the most warlike, the fiercest and the bravest of all the aboriginal clans of
Connecticut.”12 The earliest accounts of European contact with the Pequot
date as far back as 1614, but it was not until the early 1630s that the Pequot
had regular interactions with both the Dutch and English.13
The Dutch were the first to establish trade relations with the Pequot.14 In
1633, the Dutch purchased a small tract of land along the Connecticut River
from the Pequot, and sought to establish it as a safe haven for trading in the
river valley, free from harassment and violence.15 Soon after the Dutch
established this safe trade zone, the Pequot violated Dutch terms by killing
members of a rival tribe in the area.16 This act so incensed the Dutch that
the Dutch carried out their own brand of justice by executing the Pequot
Grand Sachem Wopigwooit and several of his men.17 A brief war between
the Dutch and Pequot ensued, severing the trade ties between the two
groups.18 De Forest attributes the later doomed relationship between the
Pequot and English Puritan settlers to the execution of Wopigwooit and the
subsequent war with the Dutch.19
Tales of a flourishing and prosperous fur trade in the Connecticut Valley
persuaded the English settlers in the Massachusetts colonies to petition then
Governor Winthrop to send a contingent to the area to establish a trade
relationship.20 Winthrop, however, was hesitant to oblige, having heard that
the tribes in the area were not easily pacified and the landscape offered little
11. Anglo accounts of tribal histories are often prone to misconceptions of tribal culture;
however, for the purpose of this article, it is important to understand European conceptions
of the Tribe.
12. JOHN W. DE FOREST, HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF CONNECTICUT FROM THE EARLIEST
KNOWN PERIOD TO 1850, at 58 (Hartford, Wm. Jas. Hamersley 1851). The indigenous
tribes’ pre-contact warfare was very different from the type of war that historians such as De
Forest would have known. Because tribes had small, dispersed populations and could not
afford many deaths, tribes only waged war in order to settle boundary disputes, expand
territory, or avenge insults. Men fought the wars and women and children were usually
spared. Michael Freeman, Puritans and Pequots: The Question of Genocide, 68 NEW ENG.
Q. 278, 285 (1995).
13. William A. Starna, The Pequots in the Early Seventeenth Century, in THE PEQUOTS
IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND, supra note 6, at 33, 34.
14. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 71-73.
15. Id. at 72.
16. Id. at 73.
17. Id. “Sachem” is the term that area tribes used for their head or chief. Id. at 30.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 74-76.
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in natural defenses.21 Winthrop eventually relented and the first English
settlement set out from Massachusetts in the early 1630s.22 A rift in the
relationship between the Pequot and English occurred when the English
settlers arrived in the Connecticut River Valley escorting a tribal chief the
Pequot had exiled after conquering the chief’s tribe.23 At that moment, the
English settlers had unintentionally hurled their first insult at the Pequot.24
The relationship continued its downward trajectory when the English
refused to recognize Pequot title25 to the territory.26 De Forest opined that
this may have been a result of the English settlers’ negative view of the
Pequot as intruders and thieves.27 His alternative theory was that the Dutch
had previously acknowledged Pequot title to the land, but the English
settlers had to deny title to give the appearance of denying Dutch authority
in the area.28 Returning with the exiled chief, refusing to acknowledge
Pequot title to the land, and the execution of Wopigwooit combined to fuel
the flames between the Pequot and the English.
In the summer of 1633, Captain John Stone, a slaver and privateer, sailed
up the Connecticut River, forever altering the course of Pequot history.29
History has not looked kindly on Stone’s legacy. De Forest, for one,
described Captain Stone as “dissolute” and “intemperate.”30 Following his
arrival in the river valley, the Pequot killed Stone and his crew, claiming it
was necessary in order to rescue two kidnapped Pequots Stone had captured
and forced to pilot his vessel up the river.31

21. See id. at 75.
22. Id. at 74-75.
23. See id. at 76.
24. Id.
25. For a discussion of aboriginal title and the Discovery Doctrine, see Kathleen Sands,
Territory, Wilderness, Property, and Reservation: Land and Religion in Native American
Supreme Court Cases 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253, 269-70 (2011-2012) and Blake A.
Watson, The Doctrine of Discovery and the Elusive Definition of Indian Title, 15 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 995 (2011).
26. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 76.
27. Id.
28. Id. In their quest to appropriate new lands under the guise of legal legitimacy, it
likely behooved the English colonists refused to acknowledge Dutch authority to recognize
or confer title to land.
29. Id. at 77.
30. Id. Other historians have been even less kind in their accounts of Captain John
Stone, describing him as a rogue who was kicked out of Plymouth before he could be tried
for other crimes. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 12, at 286-87.
31. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 77-78.
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The deaths of Captain Stone and his crew caused open war. The Pequot
were pitted against the English and other lesser tribes that allied with the
English in order to prevent Pequot expansion of authority throughout the
river valley.32 The ensuing war peaked in a bloody battle that decimated the
Pequot population. On May 26, 1637, a contingent of English soldiers
accompanied by their Narragansett and Mohegan allies surrounded the
Pequot fort in Mystic and set fire to the wigwams therein.33 Some Pequots
died in the fort at the hands of their enemies or from the flames; others fled
the burning fort to a line of hostile musket fire from the enemy
contingencies.34
The death toll varies from account to account, but the general consensus
is that less than a score of the Fort Mystic Pequots survived the attack. 35
Following the Fort Mystic campaign, the Pequot fled west to escape
English attack.36 This retreat concluded the war and ended just as violently
with an estimated 700 Pequots dead.37 Among the dead was the last great
Chief of the Pequot, Sassacus, as well as thirteen of the twenty-six
remaining chiefs.38 About 300 total surviving Pequots — mostly women
and children — were sold into slavery throughout the English colonies.39 In
1638, 200 of the Pequot that had not been sold into slavery to the British
American and Caribbean colonies were divided among or willingly fled to
live with the Mohegan and Narragansett.40 The land formerly owned by the
Pequot was to become the property of the English colonists; and the Pequot
were to become Mohegan, Narragansett, and Eastern Niantic.41 They did
not live in their ancient land nor identify with their ancient name.42 De
Forest concludes his account of the Pequot War with this summation: “Such
was the peace which closed the famous Pequot War; and thus, for a time,
was the national existence of that brave though savage people
extinguished.”43
32. Freeman, supra note 12, at 288.
33. Id.
34. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 131-33.
35. See id. at 133; Freeman, supra note 12, at 288-89.
36. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 152.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Michael L. Fickes, “They Could Not Endure That Yoke": The Captivity of Pequot
Women and Children After the War of 1637, 73 NEW ENG. Q. 58, 61-62 (2000).
40. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 160.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Pequot history subsequent to the 1637 war is best described by
ethnohistorian Jack Campisi: “Two themes run through Pequot history: a
tenacious persistence to maintain the tribal identity and an unswerving
struggle to hold on to tribal land.”44 By 1650, most Pequots held in captivity
as slaves or as tributes to the other tribes had managed to find a way to
escape from living under their direct control and re-establish some
semblance of autonomy.45 Notably, some of the tribes tasked with taking
custody of the captives following the war either gave their Pequot wards
great latitude in self-determination or assimilated them as part of their own
tribe.46 Two specific groups regained their independence, the Western
(Mashantucket) Pequot, originally under control of the Narragansett, and
the Eastern Pequot, originally under control of the Mohegan.47 The English
colonists established four Indian towns, two for the Western Pequot and
two for the Eastern Pequot.48
By the end of the seventeenth century, the English colonists had assumed
the position of trustee/protector over the Pequot, a role typical of the federal
government after the birth of the new nation.49 The colonial governor
officially recognized the East and West Pequot as two distinct tribes.50 They
developed as “two separate social and political entities” with autonomous,
albeit similar, cultural identity.51 The Connecticut colony granted a 2000acre tract of land in the town of Ledyard, known as Mashantucket;52 but the
Western Pequot were insistent on a land grant at the headwater of Mystic
River requested by their leader, Cassacinamon.53 Because the Western
Pequot were insistent on the grant of a different tract of land, few initially

44. Jack Campisi, The Emergence of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 1637-1975, in
THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND, supra note 6, at 117, 117.
45. Fickes, supra note 39, at 73.
46. Id. at 76-77.
47. Campisi, supra note 44, at 118.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 119-20; see also John Fredericks III, Indian Lands: Financing Indian
Agriculture: Mortgaged Indian Lands and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 14 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 105, 107-21 (1989) (discussing the federal government’s role as the fiduciary over
tribal land and investments).
50. Campisi, supra note 44, at 119-20.
51. Id.
52. RICHARD RADUNE, PEQUOT PLANTATION: THE STORY OF AN EARLY COLONIAL
SETTLEMENT 158 (2005).
53. KIM ISAAC EISLER, REVENGE OF THE PEQUOTS: HOW A SMALL NATIVE AMERICAN
TRIBE CREATED THE WORLD’S MOST PROFITABLE CASINO 42 (2002).
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occupied Mashantucket; but by the time of Cassacinamon’s death, most of
the Western Pequot had migrated to Mashantucket.54
In 1722, the Tribe’s state-appointed overseer accused the heirs of John
Winthrop, Jr. of stealing 500 acres of Mashantucket land.55 While the
allegations were never completely substantiated, the English, who wanted
land title, made a compromise in 1732 with the Mashantucket Pequot, who
sought to retain their land in its entirety.56 The compromise divided the land
in half, making half available for lease to the English colonists, while the
Pequot retained the right to use the other half.57 The compromise did little
to quell the growing resentment of the English colonists who wanted
underlying title to this leased land.58 In 1761, the colonists were finally
successful in securing title and extinguishing any future claims the Pequot
might have had under the act.59 The 1761 campaign reduced the
Mashantucket Pequot reservation to 989 acres, less than half of the original
grant.60
Over the next two centuries, the Pequot population dwindled while
illegal land sales increased.61 A 1774 census recorded 151 Pequot living on
Mashantucket; however, the number fell to less than fifty by the 1800s, as
members left the reservation to pursue other financial ventures.62 The
acreage of Mashantucket diminished at the hands of the Tribe’s overseers.
In 1855, the Connecticut General Assembly passed a law that allowed
newly appointed overseers to sell nearly 80% of the Mashantucket land,
leaving only 180 acres of the reservation intact.63
While the sale of the tribal land served as a source of funding for the
Tribe, the absence of any viable economic development at Mashantucket
54. See id.
55. Campisi, supra note 44, at 120.
56. Id. at 121-22.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Campisi believes the success of 1761 campaign was successful because many
Pequot men had died as a result of the Tribe’s involvement in the French and Indian War.
Thus, the remaining Pequot population dwindled and weakened due to the loss of the labor
force available to produce food for the Tribe. Id. at 123-24.
60. Id.
61. The alienability of Indian land was first governed by the Royal Proclamation of
1763 and subsequently by the Non-Intercourse Act passed in 1802. See Wenona T. Singel &
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21 (2005)
(providing a detailed survey of how Connecticut and other states violated the law of the time
to exploit Indian territory).
62. Campisi, supra note 44, at 125.
63. Id. at 132.
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forced members to leave the reservation in search of more sustainable work.
Many Pequot men joined whaling ventures out of New England or went to
mine granite in Rhode Island with the Narragansett.64 By 1935, a state
commission census put the on-reservation population at a mere nine, with a
remaining forty-two in the surrounding area.65
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, limited funding —
despite the income generated by the 1855 land sale — prevented the onreservation members from maintaining their households. The Tribe’s main
source of income at the time was the interest generated by the principle
from the Tribe’s trust fund, which was deteriorating almost as quickly as
the on-reservation population.66 On the other hand, the Great Depression
brought members in search of new livelihoods back to the reservation.67
By the 1941, the state Department of Welfare took authority over the
Mashantucket Pequot affairs.68 Through a series of tactics designed to
divest the Mashantucket Pequot of their land and undermine the Tribe’s
sovereignty, nearly all of the remaining Pequots living on the Mashantucket
Reservation were forced to move off the land.69 Two Pequot women,
Elizabeth George Plouffe and Martha Langevin Ellal, were the last
remaining Pequots on Mashantucket, and both women knew the importance
of protecting the remnants of their once-great nation.70 Before George
Plouffe died in 1973, she urged her grandson, Richard “Skip” Hayward and
the rest of his generation “to hold on to the land” and bring the Tribe back
to Mashantucket.71

64. Interview with Dr. Jason Mancini, senior researcher at the Mashantucket Pequot
Tribal Museum (notes on file with author), at the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and
Research Center on Mar. 23, 2012.. The Pequot worked side-by-side with the Narragansett
and other area tribal members in Rhode Island, cultivating one of the earliest Pan-American
Indian movements in New England, which likely played an important role in the area tribes’
efforts to re-establish sovereignty and autonomy. Id.
65. Campisi, supra note 44, at 133.
66. Id. at 133-34.
67. Id.
68. Robert L. Bee, Connecticut’s Indian Policy: From Testy Arrogance to Benign
Bemusement, in THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND, supra note 6, at 195.
69. Interview with Dr. Jason Mancini, supra note 64; see also Bee, supra note 68, at
194-95 (explaining that the “‘people concerns’ of welfare involved economic need, not the
preservation of Indian ethnic identity”).
70. JOHN J. BODINGER DE URIARTE, CASINO AND MUSEUM: REPRESENTING
MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT IDENTITY 44 (2007).
71. Tribal History, MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, http://www.
mashantucket.com/tribalhistory.aspx (last visited May 22, 2013).
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III. Economic Development and Mashantucket Pequot Cultural Identity
A. Federal Recognition and Early Economic Development
Most researchers agree that a land base is often an essential element to
the continuity of tribal culture.72 In the case of the Mashantucket Pequot,
opportunity and incentive were necessary to bring the Pequot back to the
reservation and to re-establish a tribal community that preserves Pequot
identity.
Hayward and the few remaining Pequots, dedicated to this purpose,
heeded Elizabeth George Plouffe’s words and began a new campaign in the
1970s aimed at revitalizing the Tribe. The first step in the Tribe’s campaign
became possible following the Supreme Court decision in Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida.73 The 1974 decision declared that the Indian
Non-Intercourse Act protected tribal lands in the original colonies.74 Armed
with this new precedent, the Tribe aimed to negotiate a settlement for the
disputed land, improve state/tribal relations, and earn federal recognition.75
In addition to federal recognition and re-securing reservation land, the
Tribe’s other specific goals were economic self-sufficiency and establishing
adequate housing76 in order to attract members back to the reservation.
Economic opportunity would be the draw, and the housing would be
necessary to both quarter the returning members and re-build an onreservation community. Hayward led the first attempt to rebuild the
reservation after securing a small housing grant from the Federal Housing
and Urban Development agency.77 Using the modest grant fund, he
commissioned a small housing complex as well as a hydroponic greenhouse
72. See, e.g., Bee, supra note 68, at 195 (“As Indian groups have argued for years, both
the land base and the cultural heritage are vital for preservation of Indian Identity.”); Robert
D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, American Indian Law Codes: Pragmatic Law and
Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 29, 47 (2000) (“Tribes that still occupy their homeland
have made these places sacred in their creation stories and subsequent history or myth.
Relocated tribes do not have this connection, but generations of births and deaths make new
places sacred.”); Mary Lawlor, Identity in Mashantucket, 57 AM. Q. 153, 160 (2005) (“In
particular, the historicization of the tribal homeland as the ground to which the tribal
population belongs in an autochthonous relation enables the Pequots to shape a counter
experience to alienation and the loss of cultural articulation.”).
73. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
74. Id. at 670.
75. Campisi, supra note 44, at 184.
76. Anne-Marie d’Hauteserre, Foxwoods Casino Resort: An Unusual Experiment in
Economic Development, 74 ECON. GEO. 112, 114 (1998).
77. James D. Wherry, Afterword to THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND, supra
note 6, at 213, 214-17.
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to grow and sell local produce.78 Unfortunately, the Tribe suffered several
false starts before finding its industrial strengths. The hydroponic
greenhouse venture failed to produce any significant returns, and various
other undertakings including maple syrup manufacturing, hog farming, and
cutting and selling cordwood were equally unsuccessful.79
Despite the Tribe’s early, underwhelming economic ventures, by the end
of the 1970s and into the early 1980s,80 the Tribe successfully lobbied both
for federal recognition through an Act of Congress81 as well as improved
relations with the State of Connecticut under Governors Meskill and
Grasso.82
The Tribe’s success in receiving federal recognition is largely
attributable to its land claim suits, and in particular, the settlement of these
claims and future claims.83 With federal recognition came the opportunity
to take advantage of federal programs made available to help revive tribal
economies. Although its hydroponic greenhouse failed to produce viable
financial results,84 new funding sources through programs such as the
Indian Government Tax Status Act85 provided the Tribe some economic
sustainability while it worked to become self-sufficient.
The Tribe’s first economic success came shortly after it received federal
recognition. Thanks to a Connecticut law that allowed charitable bingo
operations, the Tribe made its first foray into on-reservation gambling.86
The Tribe enjoyed modest success with its high stakes bingo operation.87
With the help of a Supreme Court decision that “affirmed the inherent,
sovereign rights of Indian tribes to engage in their chosen paths to
78. Id.
79. Id. at 215-16; see also BODINGER DE URIARTE, supra note 70, at 44.
80. It is also important to note here that during this time, there was a shift in Federal
policy as well as public sentiment that favored greater sovereignty and more opportunities
for economic development for native tribes. See, e.g., d’Hauteserre, supra note 76, at 114.
81. Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760 (2006).
82. See Bee, supra note 68, at 198-207. The Mashantucket Pequot path to federal
recognition was a unique one. Rather than petitioning with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a
process the Tribe believed would likely be unsuccessful, members successfully lobbied
Congress for federal legislation in the 1970s. After President Reagan vetoed the initial
legislation in 1982, the Tribe managed to lobby for a new version of the Act in 1983, which
was signed by the Reagan administration. Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-134, 97 Stat. 853 (1983).
83. See Wherry, supra note 77, at 216.
84. Id.
85. Pub. L. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605 (1982).
86. Wherry, supra note 77, at 218-19.
87. BODINGER DE URIARTE, supra note 70, at 46.
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economic development,” the Tribe resisted state political pressure aimed at
undermining its new venture.88 Connecticut eventually entered into a
gaming compact with the Tribe to secure its stake in the gaming
enterprise.89
B. Foxwoods Casino and Contemporary Economic and Cultural
Development
1. Foxwoods Casino
The passage of the Indian Gaming Regulation Act (“IGRA”)90 in 1988
marked the beginning of a new era of economic development for the
Mashantucket Pequot and other similarly situated tribes. The Act paved the
way for the Tribe’s gaming compact with the state, which, in turn, allowed
for its expansion into Class III gaming. Class III gaming is defined by the
IGRA as “all forms of gaming that are not [C]lass I gaming or [C]lass II
gaming.”91 The gaming industry generally acknowledges that a Class III
gaming license is required to operate a casino with the full array of gaming
options. In the context of the Mashantucket Pequot, the Tribe needed the
license to transform its bingo hall into a full-fledged gaming enterprise.92
By 1987, the Pequot bingo enterprise was generating more than $10 million
annually in gross sales with the Tribe netting $2.6 million.93 At the same
time, the Tribe was successful in increasing its real estate holdings to more
than 1600 acres.94
As the Tribe’s on-reservation economy began to show signs of life, the
initial goals set by Hayward — economic self-sufficiency and bringing
members back to the reservation — took hold. The Tribe’s on-reservation
population increased to more than 300 members.95

88. Renee Ann Cramer, The Common Sense of Anti-Indian Racism: Reactions to
Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgement, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
313, 321 (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)).
89. Id.
90. Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(2006)).
91. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).
92. See Kathryn R. L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success
of Indian Gaming, 5 Chap. L. Rev. 47, 50-53 (2002).
93. d’Hauteserre, supra note 76, at 116.
94. Id.
95. Sam Libby, Who Is an Indian and Who Decides, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/14/nyregion/who-is-an-indian-and-who-decides.html?pag
ewanted=all&src=pm.
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On February 15, 1992, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation
welcomed the public to the Foxwoods Casino.96 The Casino was backed by
a $60 million investment from a Malaysian enterprise that pioneered
destination casino experiences. At a quarter of a million square feet, the
casino became the largest gaming destination on the Eastern seaboard.97 It
even dwarfed the largest Las Vegas Casino, the MGM Grand, by 75,000
square feet.98 When its doors first opened, Foxwoods employed 2300
workers.99 By 1996, that number had more than quadrupled to 11,300
employees.100 Over the course of the next three decades, the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Nation went from toeing the line of obsolescence to
becoming one of the most significant economic presences in the region.
2. The Cultural Impact
The impact the Casino had on Pequot culture cannot be overstated.
While the Tribe had become federally recognized and began exercising its
sovereignty in the 1970s, the Casino was the true catalyst that brought
members back to Mashantucket. The on-reservation population of the Tribe
is higher today than it has been at any point since the establishment of the
reservation.101 In addition to drawing members back to the reservation, the
Casino’s revenue created an opportunity for the tribe to re-educate its
members on the history and culture of the Tribe that has been largely lost.
The clearest manifestation of this effort is the Mashantucket Pequot
Museum and Research Center;102 however, the effort is by no means limited
to the work at the research center or the museum exhibits. The difficult task
of recovering a cultural identity lost to oppressive assimilation requires a
multifaceted approach.
In addition to the museum, the Tribe has either hosted or participated in a
series of powwows in southern New England.103 The powwows are part of
an effort to fuel the pan-Indian movement by bringing different tribal
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

d’Hauteserre, supra note 76, at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sam Libby & Hilary Waldman, Family With Pequot Ties Finds Roots Run to Deep,
HARTFORD COURANT (Aug. 28, 1995), http://articles.courant.com/1995-08-28/news/95082
80013_1_tribe-mashantucket-pequots-foxwoods-resort-casino.
102. See BODINGER DE URIARTE, supra note 70, at 5.
103. See Ann McMullen, Soapbox Discourse: Tribal Historiography, Indian-White
Relations, and Southeastern New England Powwows, PUB. HISTORIAN, Fall 1996, at 53, 5657.
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cultures together to celebrate common ancestries and practices as well as
display the distinct aspects of different tribes.104 The largest gathering at
Mashantucket, the Green Corn Powwow, features dance contests, displays
of traditional art, and an anthropological presentation of pre-contact
culture.105
When the Tribe’s population was driven off the reservation land,
members scattered to all different parts of the country.106 Upon their return,
few of these members had anything in common with on-reservation
members, other than their ancestral lineage.107 The general public’s growing
adverse sentiment toward the Tribe’s economic boom created a sense of
urgency to educate its returning members of their common history and
culture;108 unity was necessary.
Historically, the Mashantucket Pequot and the surrounding communities
have not enjoyed an amenable coexistence. This tension likely results from
an adversarial relationship between the Tribe and its state overseers.109 The
Tribe has never been reticent in challenging the actions of the colonial,
state, and federal governments.110 When state and local officials
consistently refused to aid the Tribe during its darkest hours, on-reservation
members responded by treating those officials as trespassers when they
came to enforce ordinances, state laws, or regulations. For example, the
town of Ledyard continually refused to provide basic public services to the
reservation. This prompted the few remaining members to remedy their
situation through other forms of self-help.111

104. McMullen, supra note 103, at 57.
105. For more details on the Green Corn Powwow, see MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL
NATION, SCHEMITZUN: FEAST OF GREEN CORN & DANCE (2012) (promotional brochure),
available at http://www.schemitzun.com/uploadedFiles/Brochure.pdf.
106. Lawlor, supra note 72, at 156.
107. Id. (“[Members] hailed from different parts of the country, from different social and
political classes, and they still maintain a variety of political and religious orientations. In
addition to being Pequot, they present a broad range of ethnic backgrounds.); see also Kirk
Johnson, Tribe’s Promised Land Is Rich but Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/20/nyregion/tribe-s-promised-land-is-rich-but-uneasy.html
?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
108. See generally BODINGER DE URIARTE, supra note 70, for an in depth analysis of the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s trials and efforts to cultivate a contemporary cultural identity,
and the attempts made by outside groups to dictate the terms of tribal identity, often times
for ulterior profit-driven motives.
109. Campisi, supra note 44, at 126-27.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 137-38.
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The tension between the state and the Tribe likely grew when the Tribe’s
gaming enterprise became successful. When the Mashantucket Pequot fled
the reservation, and moved to different parts of the nation, they returned
with a plethora of ethnic, socio-economic, political, and religious
backgrounds. The public then viewed the returning tribal members as
insufficiently “Indian” to legitimately take advantage of the IGRA or
invoke tribal sovereignty.112 Furthermore, the returning members had
diminished knowledge of Mashantucket Pequot culture and history. Thus,
the only public symbol of community and tribal unification was the Casino.
In response to the public sentiment as well as the Tribe’s cultural
survival, the tribal government devoted a significant portion of its
newfound wealth to building the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and
Research Center113 as well as funding initiatives to re-connect with Pequot
culture and encourage community involvement among tribal members. The
wealth generated by Foxwoods Casino has, thus, played an intricate role in
reviving Mashantucket Pequot culture. Indeed, the very survival of the
Tribe is largely attributable to the success of the Tribe’s gaming enterprise.
3. The Current Financial Uncertainty of the Mashantucket Pequot
Gaming Enterprise
The old English adage “all good things come to an end” rang true in
2007 when the U.S. housing market slumped. In 2006, the Tribe began
construction on the MGM Grand Tower, an ambitious endeavor for any
business enterprise.114 The Tribe — like most other developers across the
country — found itself buying into the hype that bubble markets do not
burst. Rodney Butler, the current Chairman of the Mashantucket Pequot
Tribal Council, reminisced,
Every consultant, every analyst and every banker on the planet
encouraged us to keep getting bigger. . . . If it wasn’t for that, I’d
say, Jeez, maybe we’re just idiots. But these were smart people.
Then we opened the doors at the MGM Grand, and five months
later, Lehman crashes and the world falls apart.115
The completion of the MGM Tower was the moment that finally
launched the Tribe into its current financial tailspin.116 The Casino’s
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Cramer, supra note 88, at 325-27.
The price tag of the impressive museum is over $200 million.
Sokolove, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
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financial crisis forced the Tribe to implement austerity measures. It was in
this context of financial uncertainty that the UAW organizing campaign
commenced.
IV. The United Auto Workers Organizing Campaign at Foxwoods
Table game dealers at Foxwoods Casino began collaborating with the
UAW and in July of 2007 the union initiated a signature campaign with
casino table dealers in a bid to organize the three thousand workers.117 The
faltering economy and the Tribe’s precarious financial position spread
uncertainty and fear among the non-member employees.118 Employees
were particularly concerned that the new austerity measures would drive
members to take the tip-lucrative dealer jobs in the Casino. The
Mashantucket Pequot Native-employee-preference law only exacerbated
those concerns.
In September of 2007, the UAW petitioned the NLRB on behalf of the
dealers to certify them as a collective bargaining unit and force an election
at Foxwoods.119 Union officials claimed that the signature campaign started
that summer had culminated in supermajority support.120 The Casino took a
public stance opposing the unionization of the workers.
By the time the UAW filed its petition with the NLRB, the Mashantucket
Pequot had its own labor law in the tribal statutes. The Mashantucket
Pequot Labor Relations Law (“MPLRL”) was enacted in August of 2007,
mere months before the NLRB ruled on the UAW petition.121 In its initial
form, the MPLRL borrowed modestly from the National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”) with similar protective mechanisms for both workers and
the employer; however, it contained several punitive measures targeted at
employees.122 These measures included levying attorney’s fees against

117. John Christoffersen, UAW Files Petition for Union at Foxwoods Casino, USA
TODAY (Sept. 28, 2007, 12:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2007-0928-foxwoods-uaw_N.htm.
118. Only about one-third of one percent of the Casino workforce consists of tribal
members. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230, 2007 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS
285, at *4 (Oct. 24, 2007).
119. Joan Silvi, UAW, Pequots Forge Agreement, UAW.ORG, http://uaw.org/story/uawpequots-forge-agreement
120. John Christofferson, Petition Filed to Form Union at Foxwoods Resort Casino,
OJIBWE NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://reflections.mndigital.org/cdm/compound
object/collection/p16022coll2/id/23705/rec/41.
121. Foxwoods, 2007 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 285, at *15.
122. Id. at *15-*16.
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employees who advanced “frivolous lawsuits” and withdrawal of union
recognition for employees that committed prohibited practices.123
Additionally, the dispute resolution mechanism raised the question of
whether the Tribe could be an impartial adjudicator when labor disputes
arose.124 Perhaps, most importantly, the 2007 statute prohibited union
security agreements and an additional right-to-work statute freed employees
from the obligation of paying union dues, regardless of representation.125
The 2007 law’s purpose was to “provide tribal employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively with their employers, to promote
harmonious and cooperative relationships between the Tribe as an employer
and tribal employee, and to promote the health, safety, political integrity
and economic security of the tribe.”126 Union organizers were not
convinced.
The MPLRL was passed partly in response to the D.C. District Court of
Appeals holding in San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB.127 With
the blessing of D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the NLRB declared its
jurisdictional reach to regulate labor issues on reservations.128 Prior to the
San Manuel decision, the Supreme Court mandated in Federal Power
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation that “statutes of ‘general
jurisdiction’ apply to conduct and operation, not only of individual Indians,
but also of Indian tribes.”129 That holding was, however, tempered by the
interpretive canon also adopted by the Supreme Court that “(1) ambiguities
in a federal statute must be resolved in favor of Indians, and (2) a clear
expression of Congressional intent is necessary before a court may construe
a federal statute so as to impair tribal sovereignty.”130
The Board’s reasoning differed somewhat from that of the Court of
Appeals. The NLRB endorsed the Tuscarora application of federal law,
provided that Congress did not have a clear intention otherwise; but it also
123. Id. at *16-*17.
124. Id.
125. See 28 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS §§ 1-5 (Supp. 2007), available at
http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/2007%20Supplement.pdf; 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT
TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 9(c) (2008), available at http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/Titles%2024
%20-%20End.pdf.
126. 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 3.
127. 475 F.3d 1306, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
128. Id. at 1315.
129. 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (reasoning that the government has the power of eminent
domain over tribal land under the same terms as non-tribal land because Congress had not
explicitly carved out an exemption for Indians).
130. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1311.
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adopted three exceptions to this general application, which was first
introduced by the Ninth Circuit:
(1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters; (2) the application of the law to the tribe
would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there
is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress
intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their
reservations . . . .”131
In making its determination, the Board found that none of the three
Coeur d’Alene exceptions applied to on-reservation casino operations.132
The decision effectively overturned thirty years of Board precedent that
treated on-reservation tribal enterprises as arms of their respective tribal
governments outside the NLRB’s jurisdictional reach.133
The Court of Appeals departed completely from the Tuscarora-Coeur
d’Alene analysis, instead applying its own test to determine whether federal
labor law should extend to on-reservation activity.134 It determined that the
“operation of a casino is not a traditional attribute of self-government,” and
concluded that the NLRA’s jurisdictional reach would have a negligible
impact on tribal sovereignty and did not warrant “a need to construe the
statute narrowly against application to employment at the Casino.”135
Publicly, the Mashantucket Pequot seemed unconcerned by any lasting
effects the San Manuel decision might have on its authority to pass and
regulate employment and labor laws. The Tribe’s general counsel Jackson
King told the New York Times (after the board decision but before the
appeal) that he believed the decision would be challenged in court and that
the Tribe would “continue to focus on keeping [its] employees satisfied and
happy and make sure their benefits are in line, and hopefully get to the
point where they wouldn’t seek representation.”136 Unfortunately, the
Tribe’s dire financial situation following the MGM Grand Tower project

131. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)
(quotations omitted).
132. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1060 (2004).
133. Id.
134. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1315.
135. Id. at 1314-15.
136. Jeff Holtz, Worth Noting; Unions Allowed to Organize on Indian Reservations, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/13/nyregion/worth-noting-unionsallowed-to-organize-on-indian-reservations.html.
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became the Tribe’s focus at the cost of many benefits that King had hoped
would pacify employees.
When employees at Foxwoods began showing signs of interest in
organizing to collectively bargain in 2006, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal
Council found it necessary to pass its own labor statute. The “Findings”
section of the statute broadcasted the Tribal Council’s view on the San
Manuel decision:
Given its inherent authority over employment and labor relations
on the Reservation, the tribal regulation of employment on the
Reservation, and the longstanding federal policy protecting tribal
self-government and promoting tribal self-sufficiency, the Tribe
finds that the NLRA does not apply to the tribal government as
an employer. Application of the NLRA to the tribal government
as an employer would substantially impair the ability of the
Tribe to exercise its sovereign authority, including undermining
tribal employment laws, subjecting the tribal government to the
threat of strikes, and disrupting the tribal government's ability to
provide essential services to the community.137
In effect, the Tribe codified its belief that the NLRA does not apply to
tribal government enterprises, and insisted that, regardless of what federal
courts may say, the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise (“MPGE”)
was an “arm of the tribal government” — and thus outside the jurisdictional
reach of the NLRB.138
The UAW, on behalf of the Foxwoods dealers, initially ignored tribal
law and instead petitioned the NLRB.139 Because no union has ever sought
to organize under tribal law, it is safe to assume that the UAW’s hesitance
to do so was a strategic decision to litigate the issue in a familiar forum.
Additionally, the punitive measures directed at employees and union

137. 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 2(g) (2008), available at http://
www.mptnlaw.com/laws/Titles%2024%20-%20End.pdf.
138. See id. ch. 1 § 2(g)-(i) (finding the MPGE to be an arm of the government is of
particular importance). The NLRA does not consider “wholly owned government
corporation[s] . . . or any state or political subdivisions thereof” to be employers as defined
by the act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
139. Daniel Schwartz, UAW Lands Soft Punch in Battle for Union Recognition at
Foxwoods Casino, CONNECTICUT EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG (Oct. 24, 2007) http://www.
ctemploymentlawblog.com/2007/10/articles/uaw-lands-first-soft-punch-in-battle-for-unionrecognition-at-foxwoods-casino/.
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representatives in the 2007 MPLRL made the tribal system a less favorable
forum to litigate the issue, if litigation became necessary.140
The issue of a labor strike, an economic action sanctioned under the
NLRA, also weighed heavily on the Tribe. In the initial NLRB petition
decision, the NLRB rejected the tribal counsel’s argument that strikes
constituted a direct threat or effect on the political integrity or economic
security of the Tribe.141 In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that tribal civil jurisdiction did not generally extend to regulation of
non-members. The Court did, however, specify two exceptions to this
limiting rule: where “the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements” or where “the conduct of nonIndians on fee lands within its reservation . . . conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.”142 The Board distinguished the consensual
commercial relationship143 — described in Montana — from the
employment relationship issues in this case finding it inapplicable.144 It also
held that the Montana “political integrity” exception did not apply to
organizing campaign at Foxwoods, taking a moment to voice its fullthroated skepticism of the Tribe’s economic concerns:
I find particularly unpersuasive the Employer's claim,
unsupported by record evidence, that "a strike against the Tribal
Gaming Enterprise would severely disrupt the Tribe's continuing
ability to provide essential services" to its constituent members.
As previously indicated, the Employer has annual gross revenues
in excess of $ 1 billion, and approximately 98% of the Tribe's
140. See 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 §§ 5-10.
141. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230, 2007 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS
285, at *25-*30 (Oct. 27, 2007).
142. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
143. In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court listed examples that included
contractual relationships, commercial dealings, leases or “other arraignments,” in a list
derived from a string of previous case law that held tribes retained jurisdictions over certain
activities of non-members. Id. The Board, however, viewed the employment relationship as
out of the scope of the Supreme Court’s list. It specified that the Montana exception applied
to the “’commercial’ relationships arising out of business that operate on tribal lands through
the contractual relationships with the tribe.” With no evidences that a contractual
relationship existed between the employer tribe and the casino workers, the Board held the
exception to be inapplicable to the Foxwoods case. Foxwoods, 2007 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec.
LEXIS 285, at *25-*30.
144. Id. at *25-*30.
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revenues are derived from the operation of Foxwoods. Thus,
approximately 2 percent of the Tribe's annual income, at least $
20,000,000, is derived from outside sources. The record does not
indicate the Tribe's capital reserves, or the amounts needed to
fund any of its essential services. Therefore, even if the
Employer were to face a protracted strike, there is no evidence
that it would have insufficient revenues and/or capital to provide
the Tribe's 900 members with any essential public service.145
The Board certified the Foxwoods dealers as a bargaining unit and
ordered a secret ballot election.146 In November of that year, the bargaining
unit voted for the UAW to represent them to Foxwoods.147
Following the Board’s initial decision favoring the UAW’s petition on
behalf of the Foxwoods dealers, various unions sought to capitalize on
Board precedent. In April of 2008, the International Union of Operating
Engineers successfully petitioned to force an election for 310 engineering
and support employees.148 The next month, the UAW petitioned the NLRB
to recognize thirty-eight Racebook writers as another bargaining unit.149 In
2010, the UAW petitioned the United Food and Commercial Workers
Union on behalf of servers and bartenders.150 In each case, the
Mashantucket Pequot had an increased sense of urgency to escape the
jurisdictional reach of the NLRB.
In the April 2008 petition, the Tribe made essentially the same
arguments it did in opposition to the initial UAW petition in 2007;
however, this time, it expanded on its financial concerns.151 The Tribe
attempted to clarify its precarious financial position in the event of a strike
by submitting evidence of its unusual debt structure. The Board again
dismissed the economic claim as “particularly unpersuasive.”152 It stated
that there was “insufficient evidence to establish that [the Tribe] would lack
145. Id. at *30-*31 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at *33.
147. Connecticut: Casino Dealers Vote to Unionize, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 26, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/nyregion/26mbrfs-FOXWOODS.html.
148. See Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, No. 34-RC-2251, 2008 N.L.R.B. Reg.
Dir. Dec. LEXIS 88, at *1 (Apr. 1, 2008).
149. See Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, No. 34-RC-2261, 2008 N.L.R.B. Reg.
Dir. Dec. LEXIS 112, at *1 (May 2, 2008).
150. See Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, No. 34-RC-2392, 2010 N.L.R.B.
LEXIS 462, at *2 (Nov. 3, 2010).
151. Mashantucket, 2008 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 88, at *38.
152. Id.
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sufficient revenues and/or capital to provide [its] 900 members, as well as
employees . . . with any ‘essential’ public services” in the event of a
strike.153 Again the UAW petitioned in May 2008, this time on behalf of a
small group of Racebook writers, and again the Board certified the
bargaining unit making a finding identical to the April petition.154
While the Board continued to certify petitions to establish bargaining
units and order elections, the Tribe held on tightly to the belief that the
NLRB did not have jurisdiction over it; or, in the alternative, that the Board
should decline jurisdiction as a matter of discretion because exercising
jurisdiction would significantly infringe on the Tribe’s sovereignty.155 In
September of 2008, the UAW filed another petition, this time alleging that
the Tribe committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the
newly certified dealers bargaining unit.156 The Board again rejected the
Tribe’s argument, ordering Foxwoods to bargain with the local union.157
Soon after the Board’s order, the UAW and Foxwoods announced in a
joint statement that both sides would consider bargaining under the
Mashantucket Pequot labor law.158 Around the same time of the
announcement, the Tribe amended its Right to Work and Labor statutes to
make an exception to union security agreements made between bargaining
units certified under tribal law and tribal employers.159 The amended statute
retained many of the standard protections found in the NLRA and also
addressed concerns union organizers and employees had about the Tribal

153. Id. at *36-*39.
154. See generally Mashantucket, 2008 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 112. The finding
was literally identical — the Board merely attached the finding for the April petition to
support its May petition decision. Id.
155. Letter from Jackson T. King, General Counsel, The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal
Nation, to Julie Kushner, Assistant Director, Region 9A UAW (Jul. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/foxwoods791.pdf
156. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, No. 34-CA-12081, 2008 N.L.R.B. LEXIS
334, at *1 (Sept. 30, 2008).
157. Id. at *3.
158. Michael Gannon, Casinos: Union, Foxwoods Set Talks for Possible Labor Deal
Under Tribal Law, NORWICHBULLETIN.COM (Oct. 11, 2008, 1:07 AM), http://www.norwich
bulletin.com/casinos/x1776789981/Casinos-Union-Foxwoods-set-talks-for-possible-labordeal-under-tribal-law#axzz1sB42Hg6W.
159. Compare 28 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS § 3 (Supp. 2007), available at
http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/2007%20Supplement.pdf, with 28 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT
TRIBAL LAWS § 3 (Supp. 2010-11), available at http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/2010-2011%
20Pocket%20Part%20to%202008%20Tribal%20Laws.pdf; see also 32 MASHANTUCKET
PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 9(c) (Supp. 2010-11).
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Court’s ability to remain impartial in labor disputes.160 It did, however,
retain the no-strike/no-lockout provision, a distinct departure from the
NLRA.161 In this way, the end product resembled most state labor laws
governing public sector collective bargaining. Unfortunately, days before
the joint statement was released, the MPGE announced that Foxwoods and
the MGM Grand would need to lay off 700 workers.162
In 2010, the UAW and the Mashantucket Pequot announced that the two
parties had brokered the first union contract under tribal law. The parties
found common ground by agreeing to negotiate and operate under tribal
labor law while retaining their respective right to seek redress in federal
court.163 The contract gave both the union and Foxwoods reason to claim
victory. The unionized employees received, among other things, a 12%
raise over two years, a new tip distribution system over which workers had
more control, and more job security.164 Perhaps more importantly, the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) established what the union
viewed as a more neutral dispute resolution mechanism by giving the
enforcement of the CBA to a panel of neutral arbitrators as opposed to a
Tribe-appointed special master.165 The MPGE did not walk away empty
handed either. The contract provided for cost controls in the form of
flexible staffing decisions166 “at a time when gaming [had] been hard hit by
160. 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 7 (Supp. 2010-11). Specifically,
the amended statute prescribed a more detailed dispute resolution mechanism that allowed
for both the Tribal employer and union to appoint arbitrators with a third impartial arbitrator
appointed by the other two arbitrators.
161. Id. at ch. 1 § 11.
162. Id.
163. Harriet Jones, UAW Brokers First Union Contract Under Tribal Law, NPR (Mar.
14, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124625523.
164. Id.
165. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming
Enterprise, An Arm of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation and International Union,
U.A.W., AFL-CIO, art. 26 (Jan. 29, 2010 through Dec. 31, 2011) [hereinafter CBA],
available at http://uawatmohegan.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Foxwoods-Contract_Fin
al-proof.pdf. The CBA also limits the arbitrator’s ability to interpret tribal law:
An Arbitrator does not have the authority and shall not interpret Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal law. In the event that a question concerning the interpretation of
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal law arises during the Arbitration proceedings, the
parties may jointly request that the Arbitrator make application to the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court for advice on any question of Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Law.
Id. art. 26.05(f).
166. Id. art. 13.
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the recession.”167 In addition, the contract addressed the Tribe’s major
concern over workforce dissonance and strikes.168
But the greatest achievement from the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s
perspective was the protection of its sovereign right to regulate labor. The
media and tribal law experts touted the CBA as a deal that respected the
sovereignty of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.169 Julie Kushner, who was
the assistant regional director for the UAW at the time, described to the
Hartford Courant newspaper that “[w]hat we have done under this
agreement is show that the inherent rights of the employee are not in
conflict with the sovereignty of the tribe.”170
V. A Successful Campaign, but a Lost Opportunity
The historical contours of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe have shaped it
into what it is today, and inform its modern decision-making process. The
UAW labor campaign is particularly illustrative of the values the Tribe
holds sacrosanct. Campisi’s description of the Tribe, “tenacious persistence
to maintain the tribal identity and an unswerving struggle to hold on to
tribal land” ring true in this employment context.171 The Tribe was not
facing a literal threat to its land holdings or cultural continuity, but rather, a
threat to Foxwoods Casino — the source of its financial and cultural
renewal.
The Mashantucket Pequot’s tumultuous history, particularly with local
and federal government authorities, has likely instilled a fundamental
distrust in federal and state agencies. Additionally, the historically
antagonistic relationship the Tribe had with the surrounding community
undoubtedly motivated the Tribe to initially resist the non-member
employees’ attempts to bargain collectively with the MPGE.172 It is, thus, a
167. Jones, supra note 163.
168. See 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 11 (2008), available at http://
www.mptnlaw.com/laws/Titles%2024%20-%20End.pdf.
169. See, e.g. Eric Gershon, Foxwoods, UAW Agree on Contract for Table-Game
Dealers, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 27, 2010), http://articles.courant.com/2010-01-27/busin
ess/hc-foxwoods-union.artjan27_1_contract-for-table-game-dealers-mashantucket-pequot-tri
be-tribal-law; Jones, supra note 163; Daniel Schwartz, Breaking News: UAW/Foxwoods –
“Historic Agreement” Reached to Negotiate Contract Under Tribal Law, CONN. EMP. L.
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2008/10/articles/breakingnews-uawfoxwoods-historic-agreement-reached-to-negotiate-contract-under-tribal-law/.
170. Gershon, supra note 169.
171. Campisi, supra note 44, at 117.
172. The Mohegans, an offshoot of the original pre-colonial Pequot tribe, maintained a
more amicable relationship with the surrounding communities, largely as a result of its
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reasonable expectation that the Mashantucket Pequot would resist both
NLRB jurisdiction as well as an organizing campaign of non-members on
the reservation. This is certainly exacerbated by the fact that the
jurisdictional reach of the NLRB and the organizing campaign implicated
the Tribe’s economic livelihood.
A. The NLRB Reaction to the Foxwoods Organizing Campaign
The NLRB’s 2007 order invokes memories of Connecticut’s Department
of Welfare in the early and mid-twentieth century. At the time, the Tribe
suffered from severe economic depression, and its pleas for any sort of
government aid fell on deaf ears.173 Instead, the primary government
response came from the Department of Welfare’s rigid enforcement of
zoning and welfare regulations that the Tribe could not overcome because
of its dire economic state.174 The Department of Welfare’s narrow focus on
social welfare, while disregarding the Tribe’s cultural welfare, bears a
striking resemblance to the stance of the NLRB and subsequent federal
court decisions. The NLRB’s decision for the UAW Foxwoods organizing
case reflects a similarly narrow view of the various issues that should be
considered when exercising federal or state jurisdiction over Foxwoods. Its
glib dismissal of the Tribe’s economic concerns demonstrates its
fundamental misunderstanding of the critical role that Foxwoods played in
the Tribe’s survival, and a fundamental misapplication of the economic
security exception in Montana. Surely, a fuller understanding of the Tribe’s
tragic history and its past existence at the brink of extinction warrants a
closer analysis than “they can afford it.”
Additionally, the NLRB’s analysis in San Manuel and the subsequent
case law has sculpted a labor debate that reflects a general policy of placing
limitations on tribal sovereignty based on the “Indian-ness” of the act or

historic alliance with English colonists (even during the Pequot war with the English). See
DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 59. Today, the communities surrounding the Mohegan Sun
Casino enjoy a financial community agreement with the Mohegan tribe, whereas the
communities surrounding Foxwoods do not enjoy such an agreement. See generally Kevin
Ryan, Municipal and State Impact of Gaming, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 553 (2002-2003).
173. The Mashantucket Pequot Museum offers an engaging and heartfelt account of the
tumultuous years that nearly saw the extinction of the Mashantucket Pequot reservation
community in the exhibit Life on the Reservation. The exhibit offers a more complete view
of the trials and tribulations the tribe struggled through to survive years of racism and
exploitation. For more information, see MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT MUSEUM & RESEARCH
CENTER, http://www.pequotmuseum.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
174. Bee, supra note 68, at 196.
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industry in question. Using coded language such as “purely intramural,”175
the NLRB and federal courts determined that only issues such as tribal
membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations are securely in the
fold of a tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction.176 All of these categories are subject
to the unique cultural characteristics that vary from tribe to tribe, and thus,
are distinctly Hopi or Pequot or Cherokee. Activities distinctly “Indian,”
however, do not enjoy the same level of deference to tribal jurisdiction. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals espoused — and the NLRB
endorsed — the view that owning and managing a casino is “a typical
commercial enterprise, operating, and substantially affecting, interstate
commerce.”177 Thus, it is ironic that the single most important issue for
almost every tribe’s survival in a free market economy — economic
growth — is one of the least jurisdictionally sacrosanct in the eyes of the
NLRB and federal courts.
In 2011, on the heels of the successful UAW negotiations, the Tribe
petitioned the NLRB, objecting to the results of the July 2010 election for
United Food and Commercial Workers Union (“UFCWU”)
representation.178 It alleged that the election was tainted by racial rhetoric
intended to “create or inflame racial prejudice among the voters in the
election.”179 Statements such as “[t]ribal stipends are ending Jan. 1st, 2011.
Where do you think they are going to look for jobs . . . Walmart, Home
Depot . . . I think not,” were included as evidence of the racial animus that
plagued the election.180 The Tribe appealed an unfavorable ruling by an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to the NLRB, claiming that the judge
should have required the Union to prove the veracity of the claims made in

175. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
176. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230, 2007 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS
285, at *19 (Oct. 24, 2007).
177. Id.
178. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. 34-RC-2392, 2011 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 103
(Mar. 17, 2011).
179. Id. at *3.
180. Id. at *3 n.3. Other statements included:
[E]very one of our jobs are on the line. They will come to work here and are
going to take tipped positions like mine and yours. . . . They will come in and
take your job.
It’s getting scary now to think that the tribal members are losing their
checks and [our] jobs are up for grabs.
Id.
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what it alleged to be racial comments.181 The NLRB rejected this claim
stating that the comments lacked inflammatory content sufficient to
substantiate a prima facie case of racial rhetoric, in which case the
respondent would have to respond by proving the veracity of the
comments.182 Because the issues that the comments implicated were of
legitimate concern to workers, there was no evidence of intent to induce
racial tensions. The NLRB upheld the election results and certified the
bargaining unit over the protests of the Tribe.183
The Tribe’s ability to regulate labor campaigns is of particular
importance because of the adversarial nature of the campaign, which pitted
non-member employees against tribal enterprises. An organizing campaign
is inherently different in the context of tribal enterprises than the more
traditional campaigns. An element of “otherness” seeps into the organizing
campaigns on tribal reservations, often for the strategic purpose of
garnering support against the tribal employer. While the rhetoric may not
have been racial as the Tribe alleged, the member/non-member dichotomy
was still apparent in the Foxwoods campaigns.
The UFCWU decision illustrates the unique character of an organizing
campaign on a tribal reservation. This is particularly true at Mashantucket
where tribal employment law includes a preference for tribal members.184 A
typical organizing campaign is inherently a struggle between the laborer
and the capitalist. The campaigns are usually purely economic or, in other
cases, representative of a class struggle with cultural subtexts. Regardless,
the typical campaign is an act of solidarity between workers to leverage a
more substantial bargaining position against a historically exploitative
employer class.
An on-reservation campaign with the rhetoric of the UFCWU election
paints a very different picture. Campaign rhetoric is less a reflection of
labor/management disputes, and more a reflection of non-member/tribal
member tensions. Indeed, in one statement published in the NLRB opinion
rejecting the Tribe’s petition, a pro-union leaflet stated that it was not that
“management has their hands tied; the Tribe makes the call. . . . All they are
181. Id. at *5. NLRB precedent states that the burden shifts to the party “making use of a
racial message to establish that it was useful and germane.” Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
66, 72 (1962).
182. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 2011 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 103, at *3.
183. Id.
184. 33 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 §§ 1-13 (Supp. 2012), available at
http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/2012%20Supplement%20to%20Mashantucket%20Pequot%2
0Tribal%20Laws.pdf.
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concerned about is THEIR money and lifestyles . . . not OURS!”185
Statements such as these reinforce the notion that on-reservation labor
campaigns are not typical organizing campaigns. The historic tragedies of
tribes, which include both physical and cultural genocide,186 are byproducts,
albeit extreme ones, informing this modern adversarial relationship.
Given the tense undercurrents that manifest in on-reservation organizing
campaigns, exemplified in the UFCWU campaign at Foxwoods, one
wonders whether the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is best
effectuated by extending its jurisdictional reach to tribal enterprises with
such little regard for these unique, historical complexities. Deferring to
tribal labor law — when available — offers one solution to the “member
versus non-member” adversarial relationship. If the NLRB refrains from
exercising its jurisdiction in situations where there is a viable tribal labor
statute, and the tribe is not actively engaging in unfair labor practices, nonmembers could organize under tribal law, and enforce their rights under the
same.187 If the protector of employee rights were also the tribe, non-member
workers would likely view their organizing efforts as against the employing
enterprise, rather than the particular tribe. If federal jurisprudence
encouraged these roles rather than those whereby the tribes are pitted
against non-member workforces, it could shift the paradigm of onreservation labor campaigns away from the racial and restore the traditional
labor/management dichotomy.
The NLRB’s decisions throughout the UAW organizing campaign and
beyond seem to reflect an uninformed consideration of the unique
circumstances surrounding Foxwoods and the Mashantucket Pequot’s
reliance on Foxwoods for the Tribe’s survival. The threat of NLRB
jurisdiction over tribal enterprises, however, was absolutely crucial to the
185. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 2011 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 103, at *15.
186. For a lively and sophisticated debate on the technicalities surrounding the
application of the term “genocide” to the Pequot experience, compare Steven T. Katz, The
Pequot War Reconsidered, 64 NEW ENG. Q. 206 (1991), with Freeman, supra note 12, at
285.
187. As noted previously, the Foxwoods Casino and the UAW eventually agreed to
bargain under tribal law. The negotiations were a success, and lead to a first contract in
2010. At the time of this article, Foxwoods and the UAW were approaching the end of year
long arbitration in the hopes of re-negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement despite
continuing economic hardships. See Brian Hallenback, Foxwoods, Union Dealers Headed to
Arbitration, THEDAY.COM (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.theday.com/article/20120403/BIZ02/
304039940/1044 and Brian Hallenback, Foxwoods Seeking to Cut 50 Dealers’ Jobs,
THEDAY.COM (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.theday.com/article/20130313/BIZ02/303139929/
1044
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perceived success of the union organizing effort and an outcome respecting
tribal sovereignty. It is unclear whether the NLRB had ulterior motives, but
what is clear is that the looming fear of NLRB jurisdiction was an essential
bargaining tool for the union organizers and supporters. Without it, the
rather draconian labor statute that preceded the 2008 amended statute would
likely have prevented any meaningful negotiations under tribal law.
B. The Union Strategy at Foxwoods
To the credit of the tactical prowess of the union officials and
representatives in talks with the Tribe, the UAW strategy throughout the
organizing campaign was to capitalize on the Tribe’s resistance to federal
jurisdiction. The organizing and negotiating strategy of the UAW reflected
a broader understanding of how the Tribe would react to an organizing
campaign at Foxwoods. While the NLRB was satisfied to scapegoat the San
Manuel decision, the UAW recognized that collective bargaining need not
exist solely in the context of federal law.
The first indications of organizing surfaced as far back as 1998.188 The
organizing movement did not gain traction at Foxwoods until 2006,
following the San Manuel decision, when casino employees realized the
financial woes of the Tribe threatened job security and benefits.189 The goal
of any organizing campaign is to establish majority support of a specified
bargaining unit for union representation. When the UAW turned its
attention to the plight of the Foxwoods table game dealers, workers were
discontent with wages, working conditions, and the inevitable threat to
employee benefits that every sector in the country faces during a
recession.190 Thus, a campaign was ripe for success.
Around the time the organizing campaign had reached the height of its
activity among employees at Foxwoods, dealers’ starting pay was $4.50 per
hour, with the bulk of their income coming from table tips.191 According to
an UAW informational flyer, the rate was less than half of starting pay for
dealers represented by the union in Detroit.192 In addition to wages, table
game dealers had a number of grievances, including issues with their
benefits packages, working conditions, and the ratio of full-time to part-

188. See Gershon, supra note 169.
189. Jones, supra note 163.
190. Id.
191. Christoffersen, supra note 117.
192. See “Because We’re Worth It!”, UAW LOCAL 2121 (Sept. 18, 2008) (flyer),
available at http://uawatfoxwoods.org/images/stories/091808Flyer.pdf.
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time employees.193 Workplace safety also occupied a significant portion of
the campaign debate. Pro-union workers argued that the Tribe had not acted
in the employee’s best interests to address second-hand smoke in the
Casino.194
The union organizing strategy at Foxwoods is best characterized as the
dual threat of economic instability and erosion to tribal sovereignty. The
classic economic tools deployed during an organizing campaign are
picketing and striking. Under the NLRA, and the case law that has
developed following the passage of the Wagner Act, employees involved in
an organizing campaign have limited protections when utilizing these
tools.195 While picketing indeed played a public role in the UAW
organizing campaign,196 strikes were not utilized because such activity
would have threatened the Mashantucket Pequot’s tribal sovereignty —
infringing on its ability to govern its economic development unfettered by
federal law and regulation. The issue of sovereignty was, without question,
the most significant and effective bargaining tool used by the UAW and
organizing members.
Union organizers approached the table game dealers at Foxwoods a mere
month after the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in San Manuel.197 By the next
year, the organizing members had alleged at least three charges of unfair
labor practices against the Tribe, including attempts to bribe employees to
abandon the organizing campaign.198 Unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charges
are generally an ineffective tool for altering a participant’s behavior, as the
NLRB and General Council resolve most ULPs long after the conclusion of
193. UAW Files Petition for Union at Foxwoods Casino, UAW LOCAL 2121 — OUR
HISTORY (Sept. 28, 2007), http://region9a.uaw.org/local2121/index.cfm?action=cat&categor
yID=c25afcec-18f2-47ee-85fb-414111121c84.
194. At the time, it was ambiguous whether Connecticut State had the jurisdictional
authority to regulate tobacco smoke and usage through its gaming compact with the
Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan Tribes. See Mark Pazinokas, State Weighs Ban on
Casino Smoking, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/nyregio
n/connecticut/26polct.html.
195. For example, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA protected workers who staged
a walkout in protest of unsafe working conditions. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9 (1962).
196. See Michael Gannon, UAW Vows Foxwoods Protests Will Go On,
NORWICHBULLETIN.COM (May 14, 2008, 1:24 AM), http://www.norwichbulletin.com/news/x
1191419401/UAW-vows-Foxwood-protests-will-go-on#axzz1ugSWjacH.
197. Foxwoods, MASSCHUSSETTS AFL-CIO, http://www.massaflcio.org/foxwoods (last
visited Feb. 12, 2013).
198. Id. The NLRA prohibits employers from using promises of benefit to coerce
individual employees from organizing. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (c) (2006).
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the organizing campaign or parties reach settlement. Therefore ULP
charges were not a deterrent to invoking NLRB jurisdiction. Instead, UAW
officials waited until they could show a flood of support among the
potential members of the table game bargaining unit to petition the NLRB.
Under section 159 of the Act, labor organizations are able to petition the
NLRB to force an election if they allege that a “substantial number of
employees . . . wish to be represented for collective bargaining . . . .”199 The
petition, filed in 2007, asked the NLRB to interject and coordinate an
election. More importantly, section 159 of the Act required the Board to
make a ruling on whether it had jurisdiction over on-reservation labor
issues, an appeal of which would likely be sustained by a federal court.200
The threat of a court ruling on NLRB jurisdiction over union organizing
and regulation on the reservation was a significant bargaining tool that
could only be effective once, thus it would have been crucial to avoid an
appeal in federal court unless absolutely necessary. Shortly after the NLRB
ordered a secret ballot election, employees were elected by a significant
majority to be represented by the UAW.201
With every milestone throughout the organizing campaign it became
more evident that while the Tribe denied the NLRB’s jurisdictional
reach,202 it was more concerned with avoiding an appeal to federal courts
where judicial recognition of the NLRB’s jurisdiction over Foxwoods
would be all but certain.203 In the year following the election, the Tribe
refused to bargain with the newly established UAW Local 2121, arguing
that the election was fraught with indiscretion.204 After seven days of
hearings, the administrative law judge rejected the Tribe’s petition and
certified the election.205 Despite the certification, the Tribe continued to
199. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c)(1)(A).
200. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
201. Connecticut: Casino Dealers Vote to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/nyregion/26mbrfs-FOXWOODS.html?fta=y.
202. See infra Part IV.
203. While the Tribe faced the possibility of an appeal within the Second and D.C.
Circuits, both Circuits had rule either directly or indirectly on the jurisdictional reach of
federal agencies. In the Second Circuit, the court of appeals in Reich v. Mashantucket Sand
& Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996), adopted a similar test for determining whether general
federal statutes — in this case, the Occupational Safety and Health Act — applied to onreservations ventures. The holding all but guaranteed a similar conclusion of the matter of
NLRA jurisdiction over Foxwoods Casino if the case had come before the court.
204. See Foxwoods Resort Casino, N.L.R.B. Case No. 34-RC-2230 (Mar. 11, 2008),
available at http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/foxwoodsalj.pdf.
205. Id.
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refuse to bargain with the Union. Spectators assumed the Tribe’s refusal to
bargain evidenced its intention to appeal the election certification to the
federal appeals court.206 Indeed, following the certification of the election,
the tribe announced its intention to “appeal all aspects of the case” to the
appeals court.207 In another statement, however, general counsel for the
Tribe reiterated that “[t]he union could already have a contract by now if
they had followed tribal law.”208 The Tribe continued to publicly declare its
intention to appeal the case; however, when the time came to put words into
action, the results reflected the reality of the Tribe’s position.
On October 11, 2008, a mere eight days after the NLRB declared that the
Tribe must bargain with the Foxwoods local, both the Union and Casino
announced that negotiations would be conducted under tribal law.209 On the
surface, this announcement appeared to be a victory for the Mashantucket
Pequot; but a closer examination reveals the mutual benefits for the Union
as well. The Union won a key strategic victory by not only forcing the
MPGE to recognize it as the bargaining representative, but also by inducing
the Tribe to address concerns the Union had with the objectivity of a tribal
dispute resolution.210 Additionally, both sides retained the right to enforce
their rights in federal court should the situation warrant it.211
The 2008 agreement to negotiate under tribal law resulted in one of the
first collective bargaining agreements of its kind. As noted above, the
agreement sidestepped concerns of objectivity in the dispute resolution
process by creating an alternative dispute resolution process that
incorporated a neutral arbitration, rather than involving a tribe-appointed
officer or the tribal court system.212 Perhaps more importantly for the

206. Election certifications themselves are not considered final judgments for the
purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, and thus are not appealable. It is common
practice for employers to refuse to bargain after an election and certification to open a
pathway to appeal in federal court. See American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S.
401, 404-07 (1940).
207. Mashantuckets Again Defy Ruling, Set Sights on U.S. Court of Appeals, UAW
LOCAL 2121—OUR HISTORY (Jul. 4, 2008), http://region9a.uaw.org/local2121/index.cfm?
action=cat&categoryID=c25afcec-18f2-47ee-85fb-414111121c84.
208. Id.
209. Press Release, UAW, Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, UAW at Foxwoods
Announce Historic Agreement to Negotiate Under Tribal Law (Oct. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.uaw.org/taxonomy/term/12/0?page=31.
210. CBA, supra note 165, art. 26. All grievances that were not settled would be
arbitrated in front of a neutral panel.
211. Id. at Side Letter/Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Governing Law.
212. Id. art. 26.
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Union, the CBA included a side letter that addressed the “governing law”
clause. The letter, a memorandum of understanding, declared that the CBA
or any other agreement does not constitute a “waiver of any right the union
may claim to have to pursue other remedies.”213 The letter goes on to
reiterate the Mashantucket Pequot’s stance — that the Board has no
jurisdiction over its casino. It declared that by agreeing to the Union’s
memorandum of understanding, the Tribe did not acknowledge that any
additional remedies existed outside Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Law.214
The success of the union organizing campaign is attributable to the
organizers ability to shift the Tribe’s focus away from its immediate
financial concerns and to re-focus on the greater economic issue — its
retention of tribal sovereignty. In identifying and respecting the Tribe’s
ultimate goal of protecting its sovereign interests in Foxwoods, the Union
was able to apply a tactic of acculturation that induced the Tribe to embrace
progressive labor standards and avoid an encroachment on sovereignty by
the NLRB. The end result is an agreement that both sides will come to
appreciate more as negotiations continue and the ominous prospects of
labor unrest are replaced by an ongoing mutual appreciation for each side’s
bargaining positions.
VI. Conclusion
Understanding the historical context in which indigenous tribes have
shaped their contemporary cultural identity will not only breed empathy and
combat adversarial relationships, but also provide valuable insight and
context for situations such as the UAW organizing campaign at Foxwoods.
Beyond the law, there is a history that underlies every conflict, whether
legal or political. Ignoring tribal history runs the risk of repeating it, a rather
unfortunate result considering the horrific past this nation has in regards to
its treatment of indigenous tribes inhabiting North America prior to
colonization and nationhood.
An even cursory study of the Mashantucket Pequot history can be
extremely informative as to why the Tribe reacted in the way it did to the
UAW campaign, the Board’s decision, and subsequent labor campaigns.
The unique character of a member versus non-member labor campaign, and
the interconnection between tribal enterprise and cultural survival,
complicates the typical labor/management dichotomy that is more squarely
in the Board’s wheelhouse.
213. Id. at Side Letter/Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Governing Law.
214. Id.
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Whether it be exercising discretion and letting tribal law govern labor
elections, or paying more than mere lip service to these important matters,
the Board and federal courts should re-evaluate how they apply the NLRA
on tribal reservations. The organizing campaign at Foxwoods represents a
lost opportunity to cultivate a new labor regulation policy on tribal casinos.
It was not the first campaign at a tribal casino and certainly will not be the
last one consisting primarily of non-member employees. Respecting the
history and sensitive tribal issues such as cultural survival will better
effectuate the purpose of the NLRA, as well as be more informative in
determining whether tribal labor relations should govern.215 A reevaluation
of the NLRB’s policy and its perceived role in labor organizing at tribal
casinos is more important now than ever.
The success of an eventual agreement under Mashantucket Pequot tribal
law illustrates the possibility of respecting both the will of workers to
organize for their collective good and the historic and cultural forces that
guide the will of the Tribe. Both the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the
employees at Foxwoods had much to lose as the Tribe entered a new period
of financial uncertainty. The NLRB’s “business as usual” demeanor, after
overturning thirty years of non-interference in these types of matters,
ignores the historic and cultural implications at the peril of both parties. The
next time it has the opportunity to revisit these issues, the Board should take
notice of the success of the 2010 UAW/Foxwoods contract and consider
extending more deference to tribal labor law.216 This means a thorough
understanding of the history behind the Mashantucket Pequot — or any
other tribal cultural recovery — should play a prominent role in deciding to
what extent federal labor regulation applies to tribal casinos, as well as
what role the Board should play in ensuring labor rights.

215. The purpose of the Act is to “promote[] the overriding goal of industrial peace.”
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 381 (U.S. 1998).
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